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The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 was enacted in 1990 to
"provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.",2 Among other
things, the ADA seeks "to assure equality of opportunity, full participa-
tion, independent living and economic self-sufficiency for disabled peo-
ple."3 Both Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)4 and Acquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)" have been recognized as
"disabilities" 6 within the meaning of the ADA in the regulations that im-
plement the act as well as in numerous cases brought under the statute.
Indeed, HIV and AIDS were both among the disabilities Congress had in
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throp, Stimson, Putnam, & Roberts provided in the preparation of this Article.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
3. ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE 1 100 (Thompson Publ'g Group, Inc., 1990 & Supp. Dec.
1992).
4. HIV is the virus that causes AIDS. See LYN R. FRUMKIN & JOHN M. LEONARD,
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON AIDS 1, 5-6 (3d ed. 1997); see also Ray v. School Dist., 666 F.
Supp. 1524, 1529 (M.D. Fla. 1987) ("Current medical researchers have concluded that AIDS is
caused by infection with human immuno-deficiency virus (HIV)."); Janine Sisak, Confidential-
ity, Counseling, and Care: When Others Need to Know What Clients Need to Disclose, 65 FORD.
L. REV. 2747,2747 n.1 (1997) ("HIV is a virus that damages the body's immune system, leaving
it vulnerable to a wide variety of opportunistic infections and malignancies, which in turn pro-
duce an array of symptoms known as [AIDS]."); discussion infra Section I.A.
5. See discussion infra Section I.A.
6. For an excellent discussion of the evolving terminology used to describe disabilities, see
Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 1991 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 414 n.7. As
Burgdorf explains, "[p]hraseology is a significant issue with regard to disabilities." Id. This Arti-
cle will use the currently-preferred terminology, as described by Burgdorf, except when quoting
original materials.
7. See discussion infra Section III.A.
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mind when it passed the ADA.8
Since 1990, numerous cases have been brought by persons living with
HIV disease and AIDS under Title I of the Act, which addresses dis-
crimination in employment. 9 By contrast, an extremely small number of
cases have been brought under Title II of the Act, which "generally pro-
hibits a public entity from excluding a qualified individual with a disabil-
ity from services, programs, or activities of the public entity."' Persons
with HIV and AIDS nonetheless continue to face discrimination on a
daily basis from governmental bodies throughout the United States. This
Article examines one such form of discrimination: unequal provision of
social welfare benefits and services.
Undoubtedly, this discrimination is often unintentional, the result of
oversight and disregard rather than discriminatory animus." This does
not mean, however, that its effects are any less pernicious. Regardless of
intent, a city museum that opens its doors to all but provides no ramp ef-
fectively discriminates against those who cannot climb its stairs. The same
is true of providers of social welfare benefits and services. Owing to the
unique nature of the disease, persons living with AIDS require special
accommodations-a "ramp," as it were-to access and maintain the so-
cial welfare benefits and services to which they are entitled. As discussed
below, these special accommodations include home and hospital visits,
specialized training of case workers, and low case worker-to-client ratios
to ensure that the complex and rapidly-changing needs of clients are met.
By failing to provide that ramp, governmental entities throughout the
United States' 2 are effectively discriminating against those in dire need of
these benefits and services."
8. See discussion infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
9. Title I prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by any employer of more than 15
employees. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994). Title III prohibits public accommodations,
including hotels, restaurants, and retail stores, from denying persons with disabilities equal ac-
cess to their services. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12201 (1994).
10. Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 857 F. Supp. 800, 817 (D. Kan. 1994).
11. See, e.g., Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 476 (1991) ("[U]nlike discrimination based on race, sex,
or national origin, discrimination against disabled persons more often stems from thoughtless-
ness or ignorance of their abilities than from ill will.").
12. At the end of 1997, the cities of Albany, New York; Atlanta, Georgia; Cleveland, Ohio;
Little Rock, Arkansas; Omaha, Nebraska; and New Haven, Connecticut-to name but a ran-
dom few-did not provide specialized assistance or make reasonable modifications to policies,
practices, and procedures to ensure persons with AIDS meaningful and equal access to social
welfare benefits and services.
13. "According to the Federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 750,000 Ameri-
cans are infected with HIV, and fewer than 1 in 5 of them have private health insurance.
Roughly half are insured by Medicaid or other government programs, but 29 percent have no
insurance at all." Sheryl Gay Stolberg, AIDS Drugs Elude the Grasp of Many of the Poor, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1997, at A21. Of the individuals with HIV, an estimated 259,000 were living
with AIDS as of July 1997. See National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
Vol. 16:373, 1998
Americans With Disabilities Act
In enacting the ADA, Congress sought to eradicate this sort of
"unintentional" discrimination. As the Third Circuit has observed, "the
ADA attempts to eliminate the effects of... 'benign neglect,' 'apathy,'
and 'indifference.""..4 Accordingly, "[t]he prohibition of Title II applies to
action that carries a discriminatory effect, regardless of the
[government's] motive or intent., 15 The ADA requires, moreover, that
public entities "make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination
on the basis of disability."16 The Act "stress[es] the concept of equal op-
portunity, not merely equal treatment, to eliminate discrimination."'7 The
ADA thus serves as a potent and, in many ways, novel weapon in the
struggle against the "unintentional" discrimination that unfortunately
plagues many of the nation's social service providers." The ADA can
provide a means of redress, particularly in those municipalities where
persons with AIDS lack the political power to secure legislation to ac-
commodate their special needs."
In this Article, I argue that public entities that fail reasonably to ac-
commodate persons with AIDS in providing social welfare benefits and
services are in clear violation of Title II of the ADA. Part I of this Article
provides a layperson's guide to the unique characteristics of AIDS. This
section, while brief, is vital to understanding the need for reasonable
modifications in public policies, practices, and procedures to avoid dis-
criminating against persons with AIDS, as mandated under Title II of the
Act. Section L.A describes the nature of the disease, while Section I.B
demonstrates how the disease affects the ability of persons with AIDS to
access and maintain social welfare benefits and services.
Part II provides a brief introduction to Title II of the ADA. Section
II.A demonstrates that Title II is a powerful and comprehensive civil
rights law that was created, in part, to combat the discrimination ad-
[hereinafter NIAID], HIV AIDS Statistics (visited Nov. 7, 1997)
<http:llwww.niaid.nih.govlfactsheetslaidsstat.htm>.
14. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325,335 (3d Cir. 1995).
15. Tyler, 857 F. Supp. at 817; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 29 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 310 ("Discrimination against people with disabilities results from ac-
tions or inactions that discriminate by effect as well as by intent or design."); infra note 56.
16. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1997).
17. ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 3, 1 804 (Supp. Dec. 1991).
18. In passing the ADA, Congress was well aware of the discrimination suffered by the dis-
abled in social service programs. For example, Representative Levine specifically noted that
nonfederally-funded social service programs offered by state and local governments "have often
been out of reach to disabled persons." 136 CONG. REC. H2633 (daily ed. May 22, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Levine).
19. As the discussion in Subsection III.C.2. indicates, a New York federal district court re-
cently confirmed the right of persons with AIDS to reasonable modifications in the provision of
social welfare benefits under the ADA. See Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, No. 95-CV-0641, 1996 WL
633382 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1996).
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dressed in this Article. Section II.B establishes the requirements for
stating an ADA claim. Part III presents the legal argument for applying
Title II to the provision of social welfare benefits and services to persons
with AIDS, asserting that the requirements for a claim under Title II are
easily met under the circumstances. The Article concludes by noting that
the changing demographics of HIV disease only heighten the need to ex-
tend the protections afforded by Title II to persons with AIDS who are
seeking social welfare benefits and services.
I. BACKGROUND
Gloria M. was a 44-year-old woman residing in Brooklyn, New York,
who learned that she was HIV positive in 1987. In 1992, she began to de-
velop HIV-related symptoms. In the same year, Gloria stopped working
and was accepted for public assistance. She began to suffer numerous
HIV-related symptoms, including severe weight loss, constant fatigue and
nausea, and bouts of thrush, herpes, and neuropathy. In 1994, Gloria was
admitted to a local hospital for what her doctor believed to be pneumonia.
Knowing that she had a public assistance recertification appointment
scheduled, she asked the hospital social worker to contact her public assis-
tance case worker and inform the case worker that she was hospitalized
and unable to make the appointment. The case worker did not visit Gloria
in the hospital or postpone the appointment. Instead, Gloria's public as-
sistance case was closed, leaving her with no income to pay for utilities,
rent, phone bills, or food. When Gloria called her case worker to com-
plain, she was informed that her case would remain closed until she at-
tended a face-to-face recertification appointment.
After being diagnosed with tuberculosis, Gloria was discharged from
the hospital. Although she was extremely ill and desperately in need of fi-
nancial assistance, her case worker refused to accommodate her, insisting
on a face-to-face meeting at the case worker's office three weeks later. De-
spite her doctor's strict order to rest, Gloria, who walked with a cane due to
weakness and severe neuropathy in her legs, was forced to travel a signifi-
cant distance for the appointment. She took two subways and walked six
blocks in the cold to get to the office. When she arrived, her case worker
informed her that she needed numerous additional documents before her
public assistance case could be reopened. She had not received food
stamps, rent, or cash assistance in two months.2°
Sadly, the case of Gloria M. is by no means atypical for persons with
20. I am indebted to Cynthia Schneider, Esq. for this story, which is based upon an actual
case that she handled.
Vol. 16:373, 1998
Americans With Disabilities Act
AIDS.1 In cities throughout the United States, no such accommodations
are even attempted, leaving individuals such as Gloria M. helpless to ne-
gotiate the Byzantine series of agencies upon which they depend for their
livelihood.2
The following discussion provides a short introduction to HIV disease
and the unique challenges that persons with AIDS face. Section L.A
briefly describes the nature of HIV disease and the unique physical limi-
tations and medical problems that persons with AIDS face. Section I.B
examines why persons with AIDS require reasonable modifications of
benefit system policies, practices, and procedures meaningfully to access
social welfare benefits and services.
A. The Nature of the Disease
HIV disease is characterized by the progressive deterioration of the
immune system.2 In particular, "crucial immune cells called CD4+ T-cells
are disabled and killed during the typical course of infection., 24 These
cells, commonly referred to as "T-cells," play a critical role in fighting in-
fections, "signalling other cells in the immune system to perform their
special functions. ' As the number of T-cells drops, persons with HIV
become "particularly vulnerable to the opportunistic infections and can-
cers that typify AIDS, the end stage of HIV disease." 26 The term AIDS
thus refers to the most advanced stage of HIV infection.2 The United
States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which is re-
21. Indeed, New York is one of the few American cities with a specialized Division of
AIDS Services, established by Mayor Edward Koch in 1985 to accommodate the special needs
of this community in accessing public benefits and services. See infra Subsection III.C.2.
22. See supra note 12.
23. See National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases [hereinafter NIAID], How
HIV Causes AIDS (visited Nov. 7, 1997) <http://www.aegis.com/topics/hiivandaids.html>. For a
general discussion of HIV/AIDS disease, see FRUMKIN & LEONARD, supra note 4.
24. NIAID, supra note 23; see also FRUMKIN & LEONARD, supra note 4, at 7 ("In HIV in-
fection, a subset of T lymphocytes called CD4 lymphocytes are infected and killed by the
HIV.").
25. NIAID, supra note 23; see also Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1529 (M.D. Fla.
1987) ("[T]he disease destroys, and generates qualitative abnormalities, in the victim's T-
helper/inducer cells, which enable other components of the immune system to function. The
virus thereby weakens the victim's immune system."); FRUMKIN & LEONARD, supra note 4, at 9
("The subset of T cells called the CD4 lymphocyte or T-helper cells are critically important for
coordinating and carrying out much of the immune response to tumors, viruses, fungi, and other
types of microorganisms.").
26. NIAID, supra note 23; see also Deborah Dalrymple-Blackburn, Note, AIDS, Prisoners,
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 839, 842 ("[O]nce active, the virus
reproduces rapidly, depleting T-4 cells and compromising the infected individual's ability to
fight infections or unusual cancers.") (citation omitted).
27. See, e.g., Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814, 814 (W. Va. 1990)
(defining AIDS as "the last phase of the incurable HIV disease"); FRUMKIN & LEONARD, supra
note 4, at 29 ("AIDS is the final stage of HIV infection .... ).
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sponsible for tracking the spread of AIDS in the United States, has de-
veloped official criteria for defining AIDS. Included in this definition are
all HIV-infected individuals with fewer than 200 T-cells or any one of 26
clinical conditions that afflict individuals with advanced HIV disease. 2
Persons with AIDS are susceptible to diseases that normally do not
cause illness in healthy people. "In people with AIDS, however, these in-
fections are often severe and sometimes fatal because the immune system
is so ravaged by HIV that the body cannot fight off certain bacteria, vi-
ruses and other microbes." 29 These opportunistic infections cause such
symptoms as coughing, shortness of breath, seizures, dementia, severe
and persistent diarrhea, fever, vision loss, severe headaches, wasting, ex-
treme fatigue, nausea, vomiting, lack of coordination, coma, abdominal
cramps, and difficult or painful swallowing.0 Persons with AIDS are also
prone to developing rare diseases such as Pneumocystis carnii pneumonia
(PCP) and a form of skin cancer called Karposi's sarcoma.3 These dis-
eases are typically more aggressive and more difficult to treat in persons
with AIDS.32 There is no known cure for AIDS.33 Current medications
only delay the onset of AIDS, mitigate the symptoms, treat the oppor-
28. The Centers for Disease Control defines AIDS as including all human immunodefi-
ciency virus (HIV)-infected adolescents and adults aged 13 years or older who have either a)
less than 200 CD4+ T-lymphocytes/liL; b) a CD4+ T-lymphocyte percentage of total lympho-
cytes of less than 14%; or c) or any one of 26 clinical conditions, including invasive cervical can-
cer, pulmonary tuberculosis, and recurrent pneumonia. See Centers for Disease Control & Pre-
vention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 1993 Revised Classification System for HIV
Infection and Expanded Surveillance Case Definition for AIDS Among Adolescents and Adults,
41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. No. RR-17, at 1 (Dec. 18, 1992). In children under
13 years of age, the definition of AIDS is similar except that lymphoid interstitial pneumonitis
and recurrent bacterial infections are included in the list of clinical conditions. See Centers for
Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Classification System for
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infection in Children Under 13 Years of Age, 36
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. No. 15, at 224 (Apr. 24,1987). See generally FRUMKIN
& LEONARD, supra note 4, at 17-19 (setting forth the CDC definition).
29. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases [hereinafter NIAID], HIV Infec-
tion and AIDS (visited Nov. 7, 1997) <http://www.aegis.com/topics/whataidsis/html>; see also
Estate of William Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1267 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1991) (noting that, with AIDS, "the body is unable to withstand infections it would normally
suppress") (quoting Doe v. Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 380 (D.N.J. 1990)).
30. See NIAID, supra note 29; FRUMKIN & LEONARD, supra note 4, at 30.
31. See, e.g., Benjamin R., 390 S.E.2d at 815 n.2; JOHN G. BARTLETT & ANN K. FINK-
BEINER, THE GUIDE TO LIVING WITH HIV INFECTION 72-75 (3d ed. 1996); FRUMKIN &
LEONARD, supra note 4, at 33-36.
32. See NIAID, supra note 29; see also Dalrymple-Blackburn, supra note 26, at 842 n.25
("AIDS Dementia Complex, a neurological disorder which causes cognitive motor, and behav-
ioral dysfunction, may afflict individuals in either early or advanced stages of infection.") (citing
Leon D. Prockop, AIDS Dementia Complex, 9 J. LEGAL MED. 509,512 (1988)).
33. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Resurgent Tuberculosis Epidemic in the Era of AIDS: Re-
flections on Public Health, Law, and Society, 54 MD. L. REv. 1, 8 (1995) ("[T]here are no bio-
logical methods to render persons infected with HIV non-infectious, and pharmacological pre-
ventions and treatments are neither fully preventive nor curative.").
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tunistic infections, and possibly delay death.34
B. The Need for Reasonable Modifications
The unique characteristics of AIDS make it extremely difficult or im-
possible for persons with AIDS to access benefit systems with onerous
application processes; ongoing documentation requirements; constant,
mandatory office appointments; infection-ridden waiting rooms and shel-
ters; and understaffed offices whose employees are not trained to under-
stand or to accommodate the needs of persons with AIDS.3 5 Accordingly,
persons with AIDS require reasonable modifications of such policies,
practices, and procedures to assure not only equal but meaningful access
to social welfare benefits and services.
Quite simply, persons with AIDS have special needs. "The oppor-
tunistic infections and chronic conditions that result from a weakened
immune system limit the HIV-infected person's ability to engage in usual
activities of daily life such as traveling, standing in line, attending sched-
uled appointments, completing paper work, and otherwise negotiating
medical and social-service bureaucracies."36 These individuals often expe-
rience a rapid deterioration in health requiring several categories of assis-
tance at once. Constant need for medical attention disrupts the ability of
persons with AIDS to fulfill application and reporting requirements.3 7
Frequent and extended hospitalization makes it difficult or impossible to
attend required appointments with case workers." Due to the stigma at-
tached to HIV disease, moreover, these individuals are often estranged
from family and friends and thus cannot enlist the assistance of others.39
34. See Dalrymple-Blackburn, supra note 26, at 843.
35. In many areas, one is required to be at the welfare office by 8:00 A.M. in order to
make application, but then [may] be required to wait until 3:30 P.M. to see anyone.
[She] then may be treated like just another number in an overburdened system, being
told that certain forms are not complete (which may mean doing the process again after
a week's delay), and being informed that there is no assistance available .... If welfare
is available, there is often a delay of six weeks before it begins.
Jack Hamilton & Vicki L. Morris, The Psychological Aspects of AIDS, in THE AIDS
CAREGIVER'S HANDBOOK 81,88 (Ted Eidson ed., 1988).
36. Affidavit of Dr. Gabriel Torres, dated Feb. 14, 1995, 6, Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, No.
95-CV-0641 (S.D.N.Y.) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
37. See BARTLETT & FINKBEINER, supra note 31, at 202-03 ("People with HIV infection
are in extraordinary need of help with work, home life, medical care, medical insurance, legal
issues, finances, and psychological problems. Furthermore, people with HIV infection are sub-
ject to so many sudden changes in health that planning becomes difficult.").
38. "The precipitous changes in physical and emotional health status throughout the trajec-
tory of the disease and the concomitant psychosocial and physiological problems present a
challenging complexity of healthcare needs of persons with HIV/AIDS." R.A. Berk & J.P.
Nanda, Prediction of the Healthcare Needs of Persons with HIVIAIDS from Preliminary Health
Assessment Information, 9 AIDS CARE 143, 143 (1997).
39. See, e.g., William A. Bradford, Jr., Rendering Legal Aid to People with AIDS, PRAc.
LAW., June 1991, at 23,25-26 ("Many in the PWA [Persons With AIDS] community have been
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Meanwhile, case workers with exorbitant client caseloads find it difficult
or impossible to assist clients fully with such substantial needs.'
The severe and recurrent nature of the disease41 makes it impossible
to maintain open entitlement cases and thus leads to the closure of wor-
thy and desperately important cases. In addition, the requirement that
persons with AIDS travel to and wait in infection-ridden public waiting
rooms is not only dangerous but life-threatening for these individuals
with severely weakened immune systems.42 For example, persons with
AIDS are highly susceptible to tuberculosis (TB) 43 and other infectious
diseases. For this reason, persons with AIDS also require medically-
appropriate transitional and permanent housing.44
To assure the effectiveness of TB medications and new "drug cock-
shunned, vilified, and discriminated against by both the public and private sector, and have lost
friends and family because of the stigma associated with the disease.... The health care com-
munity, the social welfare community, and the religious community have too often lacked com-
passion when dealing with infected individuals."); Rhonda R. Rivera, Lawyers, Clients, and
AIDS: Some Notes from the Trenches, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 895 (1989) ("Many persons with
ARC (AIDS-related complex) or AIDS have no biological family upon whom they can either
rely or in whom they can trust.").
40. See Bradford, supra note 39, at 27-28 ("In addition to the complicated regulations,
problems in [the area of public entitlements] come from dealing with a bureaucracy that is
sometimes lethargic and even hostile to PWAs."); THOMAS P. McCORMICK, THE AIDS
BENEFITS HANDBOOK 5 (1990) ("Workers are often rushed and overworked. Bureaucratic jar-
gon, application forms, and notices to applicants can be well-nigh incomprehensible.").
41. See NIAID, supra note 29 ("Many people are so debilitated by the symptoms of AIDS
that they are unable to hold steady employment or do household chores. Other people with
AIDS may experience phases of intense life-threatening illness followed by phases of normal
functioning.").
42. "Beyond the obvious impairment on the ability to procreate, even an asymptomatic
HIV-positive individual can not travel freely. Such an individual must always be mindful of ex-
posure to bacterial infection and fungi or even places requiring vaccinations." Anderson v. Gus
Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763,777 n.37 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
43. For an excellent and exhaustive discussion of the interplay between tuberculosis and
HIV disease, see Gostin, supra note 33. Gostin explains:
The rate of new tuberculosis cases among persons with AIDS is almost 500 times that
of the general population. This astonishing rate is most likely explained by the damage
that the HIV disease does to the immune system. Many clinicians have long believed
that persons with HIV infection are at increased risk of contracting [Mycobacterium
tuberculosis] infection following exposure, and recent investigations of tuberculosis
outbreaks in congregate settings have strongly supported this clinical perception.
Ia at 31-32 (citations omitted). Gostin also points out, inter alia, that the clinical course of tu-
berculosis is dramatically different in individuals with HIV disease, and that such individuals are
more likely to be infected with drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis. See id at 32, 33; see also
Peter A. Selwyn, Tuberculosis and AIDS: Epidemiologic, Clinical, and Social Dimensions, 21
J.L. MED. & ETHics 279, 280 (1993) ("[P]ersons with HIV infection and latent tuberculosis in-
fection have a risk for development of active tuberculosis disease which is over 100 times in-
creased compared to people not infected with HIV.").
44. See Mixon v. Grinker, 595 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (challenging New York
City's policy of placing persons with HIV disease in non-segregated shelters on the grounds that
"placing HIV infected persons, whose immune systems are severely weakened, in a shelter
where many residents have infectious diseases endangers the lives of the HIV infected individu-
als"), affd in part and modified in part, 627 N.Y.S.2d 668 (App. Div. 1995), rev'd, 669 N.E.2d
819 (N.Y. 1996).
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tails" and protease inhibitors45 now available to treat HIV disease,
moreover, it is vital that persons with AIDS retain their Medicaid bene-
fits. When these individuals lose their benefits, they are no longer able to
secure medication. Individuals whose benefits are terminated also find it
difficult or impossible to maintain treatment regimens while seeking to
reactivate their benefits. 6 The consequences can be disastrous, since
"[e]ven missing a few doses can ruin the treatment."47 Failure to complete
the treatment regimen results in grave danger and harm not only for the
individuals in question, but also for society at large, since it is believed
that uncompleted treatment regimens may generate more virulent strains
of HIV 4s and the TB virus.49
45. The latest development in the fight against HIV disease is the prescription of so-called
"drug cocktails," which consist of two older AIDS drugs, such as AZT and 3TC, and the latest
anti-viral drug, protease inhibitors. See, e.g., Elizabeth Kastor, The New "Miracle" AIDS Drugs:
A Dose of Hope and Hard Reality; Researchers Caution That Treatment Has Mixed Results,
WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1996, at Al. When used in combination, these drugs have been found to
reduce the levels of the HIV virus in some individuals to below detectable levels. See id; see
also Lawrence K. Altman, Hope vs. Hype, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1997, § 1, at 1 ("There are sev-
eral combinations, many that include the new protease inhibitors, or antiviral drugs. All can
drive the amount of H.I.V., the AIDS virus, below the levels of detection in the blood for up to
18 months, which is as long as testing has been done."); Nigel Hawkes, New Drugs Cut Level of
HIV, TIMES (London), July 8, 1996 (Home News Section) ("[A] triple-drug combination which
included one of the protease inhibitors reduced the virus below detectable levels.").
46. Indeed, "[j]ust taking the combination therapy is a difficult regimen." New Treatments
Fail to Stop AIDS, DETROrr NEWS, Sept. 30, 1997, at Al. This therapy includes "taking up to 20
pills a day in a rigid regimen that even the most compulsive person could find difficult." Law-
rence K. Altman, AIDS Meeting: Signs of Hope, and Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1996, § 1, at
1; see also Kastor, supra note 45 ("The drugs must be taken several times a day, some on an
empty stomach, others with a high-fat meal. For those who suffer from HIV 'wasting syndrome'
or other intestinal problems, managing to eat what they need is difficult enough without adding
new complexities. And as AIDS increasingly becomes a disease of the poor and the drug-
addicte4 the complexities of such lives will only make treatment regimens more daunting.")
(emphasis added).
47. New Treatments Fail to Stop AIDS, supra note 46; see also Altman, supra note 45
(noting that "skipping just a few doses can be a fatal step").
48. See Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disable&k The Legal Impact of
the New Social Construction of HIV, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 7,40-41 (1997):
In the campaign against tuberculosis, public health officials learned the importance of
individuals adhering to and completing a drug therapy to prevent drug resistance. It is
likely that similar vigilance in taking medication will be required in the case of the new
protease inhibitors .... For society at large the result may be the development of
drug-resistant strains of HIV that can later be communicated to other individuals.
Thus, as is always true with an infectious disease, the fate of one individual affects the
fate of others.
Id (citations omitted); see also FRUMKIN & LEONARD, supra note 4, at 147-48 (noting that HIV
may develop resistance to antiviral drugs); Altman, supra note 46 ("Drug-resistant strains of the
virus might emerge among individuals who do not take the drugs according to schedule or who
stop taking them because they feel better. Under such circumstances, resistant strains could be
transmitted to others."); Denise Grady, New Studies Offer Hope and Caution on AIDS Thera-
pies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1997, at Al ("Failing to comply with the regimen can ultimately be
fatal, with the development of resistant strains of the virus.").
49. See Gostin, supra note 33, at 15-16 ("If persons with tuberculosis take their medication
in an incomplete or sporadic fashion, or if they receive suboptimal dosage or an insufficient
number of drugs in the regimen, then the hardy bacilli survive and can go on to multiply and
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Finally, the new drugs themselves create additional complications for
persons with AIDS: "The most common side effects associated with pro-
tease inhibitors include nausea, diarrhea and other gastrointestinal symp-
toms. In addition, protease inhibitors can interact with other drugs re-
sulting in serious side effects."5 The requirement that many of the new
drugs be refrigerated further complicates matters.5 Individuals taking the
new drugs find it impossible to spend the significant time required to
travel to and wait in social welfare offices lest they miss their scheduled
dosages.
Reasonable modifications for persons with AIDS should include,
among other things, hospital and home visits by social service case work-
ers; low client-to-case worker ratios to ensure that case workers will be
available to meet the considerable needs of persons living with AIDS;
relaxation or waiver of office appointments, face-to-face recertification,
and ongoing documentation requirements; access to all social welfare
benefits and services through a single case worker in a single office;
medically-appropriate transitional and permanent housing with refriger-
ated food and medicine storage; and a grace period for noncompliance
with any requirements, during which a reasonable good faith search is
conducted before benefits and services are terminated 2
Finally, specialized training in the needs of clients with AIDS is essen-
tial to ensure meaningful and equal access to benefits and services and to
avoid the misunderstanding and prejudice that persist against those with
AIDS.53 Training is also necessary to ensure that HIV-related informa-
produce drug-resistant active tuberculosis within months."). The result is disastrous not only for
society-multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis has increased significantly since the mid-1980s-but,
of course, for the individuals themselves, since "the outcome of treatment for persons with mul-
tidrug-resistant tuberculosis and the HIV infection is dire." Id. at 17.
50. NIAID, supra note 29; see also Parmet & Jackson, supra note 48, at 8 ("In fact, the new
medications are extremely cumbersome to take, can produce horrible side-effects and do not
work for many individuals."); Grady, supra note 48 ("And even following the regimen exactly
can be difficult-side effects of the drugs can include chronic vomiting and diarrhea.").
51. Altman, supra note 45 (noting that "some drugs must be refrigerated").
52. The City Council for New York City recently amended the city's administrative code to
mandate all of the modifications set forth in this paragraph in the provision of benefits and
services to eligible persons with clinical/symptomatic HIV illness or AIDS. See N.Y. CrrY
ADMIN. CODE §§ 21-126 to -128 (approved July 11, 1997). For a discussion of the ADA litiga-
tion that helped to prompt the passage of this law, see discussion infra Subsection III.C.2.
53. See, e.g., Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402,413 (N.D. Ohio
1991) ("Failure to maintain confidentiality [regarding] HIV status creates a likelihood of dis-
crimination...."); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 384 (D.N.J. 1990) (noting
the "stigma and harassment that comes with public knowledge of one's affliction with AIDS");
Sisak, supra note 4, at 2755 n.40 ("Significant harm can result from a breach of confidentiality.
The stigma associated with the disease fosters hostility toward people with HIV, often resulting
in ostracism and discrimination."); see also Karen L. Lovitch, Additional Article: State AIDS-
Related Legislation in the 1990s: Adopting a Language of Hope Which Affirms Life, 20 NOvA L.
REv. 1187, 1227-28 (1996) ("State governments must set an example for private employers by
educating their own workers to encourage more compassionate responses to people living with
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tion remains confidential, in compliance with numerous state laws.S
As the following analysis demonstrates, these or similar modifications
are not discretionary; they are mandated by the ADA.
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
A. Title II of the ADA: A Powerful Weapon
Together with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,55 Title II of the
ADA is a powerful weapon in the battle against discrimination by state
and local governments. Perhaps the chief virtue of the Act, noted above,
is that it applies to actions that have a discriminatory effect, regardless of
motive.56 As one court recently observed:
It is important to keep in mind that lawmakers made clear that the ADA was
norm-changing legislation, akin to the legislative turning points in this coun-
try's struggle to overcome racial discrimination. President Bush referred to
the Act as an "historic new civil rights Act." Senator Tom Harkin, the cham-
pion of the Act, announced it to be the "2 0 century Emancipation Procla-
mation for all persons with disabilities," while Senator Dole called it "the
most comprehensive civil rights legislation our Nation has ever seen." Unlike
other legislation designed to settle narrow issues of law, the ADA has a com-
prehensive reach and should be interpreted with this goal in mind."5
HIV disease and to prevent further transmission.").
54. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120980 (West 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 19a-583 (West 1997) ("No person who obtains confidential HIV-related information
may disclose or be compelled to disclose such information .... ); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
381.004(3)(G) (West 1993 & Supp. 1998) ("No person to whom the results of a [HIV] test have
been disclosed may disclose the test results to another person except as authorized by this sub-
section .... "); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782(1) (McKinney 1993) ("No person who obtains
confidential HIV related information in the course of providing any health or social service or
pursuant to a release of confidential HIV related information may disclose or be compelled to
disclose such information .... ).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). Enacted in 1973, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
"generally prohibits discrimination against the handicapped in any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance." Council for the Hearing Impaired Long Island, Inc. v. Ambach,
610 F. Supp. 1051, 1057 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
56. See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 335 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Because the ADA evolved
from an attempt to remedy the effects of 'benign neglect' resulting from the 'invisibility' of the
disabled, Congress could not have intended to limit the Act's protections and prohibitions to
circumstances involving deliberate discrimination."); Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924
F. Supp. 763, 773 (E.D. Tex. 1996) ("One can also violate the ADA by omission."); Tyler v.
City of Manhattan, 857 F. Supp. 800, 817 (D. Kan. 1994); Concerned Parents to Save Dreher
Park Ctr. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 846 F. Supp. 986, 991 (S.D. Fla. 1994) ("[A]ctions that have
the effect of discriminating against individuals with disabilities.., violate the ADA."); supra
notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
57. Anderson, 924 F. Supp. at 771 (citations omitted); see also Burgdorf, supra note 6, at
414-15 ("The [ADA], while certainly inspired by, and having many of the same ultimate goals
of, prior civil rights legislation, has introduced some innovative approaches and may provide a
somewhat different model for framing a nondiscrimination statute. The ADA constitutes a sec-
ond-generation civil rights statute that goes beyond the 'naked framework' of earlier statutes
and adds much flesh and refinement to traditional nondiscrimination law.").
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Title II benefits, moreover, from an established body of case law that
favorably interprets analogous provisions of Section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act. This law is applicable to Title II of the ADA. 8 Accordingly,
relevant Rehabilitation Act case law and provisions shall be cited con-
comitantly with ADA case law and provisions throughout this analysis.
Finally, the ADA benefits from the clear and forceful regulations is-
sued by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). Congress ex-
pressly authorized the DOJ to "promulgate regulations in an accessible
format that implement [Title II].""9 Accordingly, "these regulations must
be given 'legislative and hence controlling weight unless they are arbi-
trary, capricious, or clearly contrary to the statute."'" As we shall see, the
regulations unequivocally establish the rights of the disabled to meaning-
ful and equal access to public benefits, services, and programs.
B. The Requirements of an ADA Claim
Title II of the ADA broadly provides:
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in
or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
58. As the Department of Justice (DOJ) has explained, "the standards adopted by Title II
of the ADA for State and local government services are generally the same as those required
under section 504 for federally assisted programs and activities." 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 467
(1997). In addition, the DOJ regulations provide that Title II of the ADA "shall not be con-
strued to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to that title."
28 C.F.R. § 35.103(a) (1997); see also ADA COMPLIANCE GuDE, supra note 3, 1 122 (Supp.
Feb. 1992) ("The ADA does not reduce the scope of coverage or apply a lesser standard than is
required by section 504."). Case law is in accord. See, e.g., Helen L., 46 F.3d at 330 n.7 ("The
law developed under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is applicable to Title II of the
ADA."); Hope v. Cortines, 872 F. Supp. 14,21 (E.D.N.Y.) ("The regulations implementing title
II of the ADA likewise confirm the uniformity of interpretation between the ADA and the Re-
habilitation Act .... ), affd, 69 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 1995); Tugg v. Towey, 864 F. Supp. 1201, 1205
n.4 (S.D. Fla. 1994) ("Based upon the close relationship between the two acts, cases interpreting
the Rehabilitation Act are considered persuasive authority for interpreting the ADA.").
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (1994); see Ellen S. v. Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 859 F. Supp. 1489,
1493 n.6 (S.D. Fla. 1994) ("'Rather than outline the specific obligations of public entities under
[Title II], the ADA directed the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to promulgate regula-
tions. . . ."') (quoting Kinney v. Yerusalim, 812 F. Supp. 547, 548 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 9 F.3d 1067
(3d Cir. 1993)).
60. Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F. 3d 1150,1153 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Mor-
ton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984)); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) ("[C]onsiderable weight should be accorded to an execu-
tive department's constructions of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer."); Helen L.,
46 F.3d at 331 ("Because Title II was enacted with broad language and directed the Department
of Justice to promulgate regulations..., the regulations which the Department of Justice prom-
ulgated are entitled to substantial deference."); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp.
1310, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("In interpreting the meaning of a statute, substantial deference is
due the interpretation given its provisions by the agency charged with administering that stat-
ute.") (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994)).
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entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.
61
It is now well established that to state a claim under Title II of the
ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he or she is, or he or she rep-
resents the interests of, "a qualified individual with a disability"; (2) that
the defendant is subject to the ADA; and (3) that the plaintiff, by reason
of his or her disability, was denied the opportunity to participate in or
benefit from some public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was
otherwise discriminated against by the public entity.62
Each of these requirements is examined below. As the discussion in-
dicates, persons with AIDS who are denied meaningful and equal access
to social welfare benefits and services easily satisfy these requirements.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
This Part examines each of the three requirements for a claim under
Title II of the ADA. Section III.A. demonstrates that a person with
AIDS can be classified as a "qualified individual with a disability" under
two independently dispositive tests. Section III.B. succinctly explains that
the ADA is clearly applicable to the provision of social welfare benefits
and services by all state and local governments and their instrumentali-
ties. Finally, Section III.C. is divided into two parts. Subsection III.C.1
analyzes the relevant DOJ regulations, which are exceedingly helpful in
establishing the all-important third prong of an ADA claim; Subsection
III.C.2 reviews the relevant supporting case law, including Henrietta D. v.
Giuliani,63 a case directly on point.
A. "Qualified Individual with a Disability" Under Title II
Section 12131 of the ADA defines the term "qualified individual with
a disability" as
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications
to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication,
or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services,
meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the
participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.
64
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994). The analogous provision in the Rehabilitation Act provides:
"No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States... shall, solely by rea-
son of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance ..... 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West Supp. 1997).
62. See Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 863 F. Supp. 483, 488 (E.D. Mich.
1994); Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 857 F. Supp. 800, 817 (D. Kan. 1994); Concerned Parents to
Save Dreher Park Ctr. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 846 F. Supp. 986, 990 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
63. No. 95-CV-0641,1996 WL 633382 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25,1996).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1994).
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This definition is further clarified by the DOJ regulations, which es-
tablish three alternative meanings for the term "disability" under Title II:
"Disability means, with respect to an individual, a physical or mental im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as
having such an impairment."6 Persons with AIDS plainly meet at least
the first of these definitions, and possibly the third as well, and thus they
are "individuals with disabilities" under Title II. This analysis only ap-
plies, moreover, to qualified individuals with AIDS, i.e., those who
"meetl the essential eligibility requirements"' for the benefits and serv-
ices at issue.
1. HIV disease is a disability under the ADA
HIV disease, and particularly symptomatic HIV disease and AIDS, is
a disability under the ADA. This appears to be an uncontroversial
proposition in light of the unequivocal legislative history and explicit
regulations that the DOJ has promulgated. Additionally, no court has
ever held that symptomatic HIV disease or AIDS is not a disability under
the ADA." There are warning signs, however. In Ennis v. National Asso-
ciation of Business and Education Radio, Inc.,6 the Fourth Circuit held in
dicta that HIV-positive status is not a disability per se within the meaning
of the ADA. Instead, the court ruled that "the plain language of the
provision requires that a finding of disability be made on an individual-
by-individual basis., 70 The Fourth Circuit recently affirmed this ruling en
banc in Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Maryland, N.A.71
The Ennis and Runnebaum decisions do not alter the analysis of this
Article. 72 In those cases, the Fourth Circuit examined the question
65. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1997). "If an individual meets any one of these three tests, he or she
is considered to be an individual with a disability for purposes of coverage under the Americans
with Disabilities Act." 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 468 (1997).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1994); see, e.g., Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 716 F. Supp. 796, 799
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
67. Search of LEXIS, Genfed Library, Courts File (Feb. 23,1998).
68. 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995).
69. See id. at 59-60.
70. ld at 59.
71. 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
72. It is accordingly beyond the scope of this Article fully to analyze the Ennis and Runne-
baum decisions. Others, however, have offered an outstanding critique of Ennis and its progeny
(including, by implication, Runnebaum). See, e.g., Parmet & Jackson, supra note 48, at 32-39.
The authors explain, inter alia:
[W]hat is most remarkable about many of the recent cases that have questioned the
disability status of asymptomatic HIV-positive plaintiffs is their blatant disregard of
the legislative history of the ADA. While purporting to be faithful to the statutory
edict, these courts ignore a legislative history that is as clear as any. And, in doing so,
they ignore the critical public health imperatives that led Congress to seek to protect
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whether asymptomatic HIV infection is a disability under Title I of the
ADA.73 The Fourth Circuit certainly did not rule that symptomatic HIV
disease or AIDS is not a disability under the Act. No court has ever done
so.' Further, unlike the DOJ regulations enacting Title II (set forth be-
low), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's regulations de-
fining the term "impairment" under Title I of the ADA do not specifi-
cally mention HIV.7 ' Nevertheless, it is important briefly to reiterate that
HIV disease, and certainly symptomatic HIV disease and AIDS, is
clearly a disability under Title II of the ADA.76
The DOJ regulations expressly establish HIV disease as a disability
under Title II of the ADA: "The phrase physical or mental impairment
includes.., such contagious and noncontagious diseases and conditions
as... HIV disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis,
drug addiction, and alcoholism."77 Again, these regulations must be given
HIV-positive individuals in the first place.
Id. at 41 (citations omitted). Indeed, the discussion infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text
demonstrates that the Fourth Circuit is simply wrong; the legislative history and the DOJ regu-
lations expressly and unequivocally establish HIV disease-whether symptomatic or asympto-
matic-as a disability under the ADA.
73. For the argument in favor of finding asymptomatic HIV infection a disability under the
ADA, see the dissent in Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 176 (Michael, J., dissenting); Parmet & Jack-
son, supra note 48; and Robert A. Kushen, Note, Asymptomatic Infection with the AIDS Virus
as a Handicap Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 563 (1988).
74. See supra note 67.
75. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1997).
76. In light of the Fourth Circuit's rulings and recent advancements-real or perceived-in
the fight against HIV disease (which may well have influenced the Fourth Circuit's reasoning),
it cannot be considered unduly pessimistic to establish, rather than assume, that symptomatic
HIV disease and AIDS are protected disabilities under the ADA:
[A]s medicine brings cause for optimism, developments in the law create cause for
alarm. Driven on the one hand by the apparent imperatives of legal reasoning and the
"plain language" of the statute, and on the other hand, by changing perceptions of
what it means to be "HIV-positive," these cases have undermined the legal protections
against HIV discrimination. The implications of these developments are ominous.
Parmet & Jackson, supra note 48, at 39.
77. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1)(ii) (1997) (emphasis added). The DOJ analysis further empha-
sizes this point:
In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), a case involving an
individual with tuberculosis, the Supreme Court held that people with contagious dis-
eases are entitled to the protections afforded by section 504. Following the Arline deci-
sion, this Department's Office of Legal Counsel issued a legal opinion that concluded
that symptomatic HIV disease is an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity; therefore it has been included in the definition of disability under this part.
The opinion also concluded that asymptomatic HIV disease is an impairment that sub-
stantially limits a major life activity, either because of its actual effect on the individual
with HIV disease or because the reactions of other people to individuals with HIV dis-
ease cause such individuals to be treated as though they are disabled.
28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 469 (1997); see also ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 3, 1
231, 240, 242 (Supp. Mar. 1992) (discussing the inclusion of people infected with AIDS or the
HIV virus within the protective scope of the ADA); id. 1 710 (Supp. Oct. 1992) ("[M]any states
have recently revised their codes to expressly include people with AIDS in their definition of
disability.").
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"legislative and hence controlling weight," since they are not arbitrary,
capricious, or clearly contrary to the statute,78 as the legislative history of
the statute makes clear.
In fact, courts?° and commentators 81 have noted that the legislative
history of the ADA specifically mentions HIV disease as being included
in the ADA's definition of "disability." For example, the House Report
explains that "[tihe need for omnibus civil rights legislation was also one
of the major recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the
HIV Epidemic." The House Report then quotes with favor a portion of
the Presidential Commission's Report that states, inter alia: "'All persons
with symptomatic or asymptomatic HIV infection should be clearly in-
cluded as persons with disabilities who are covered by the anti-
discrimination protections of this legislation."'8 3 The House Report ex-
plains that it was not possible to list all of the specific conditions that
would constitute physical or mental impairments, but adds: "The term in-
cludes, however, such conditions, diseases, and infections as... infection
with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus...."" The Senate report is in
accord."s These committee reports are "the authoritative source for find-
ing the Legislature's intent" and decisively establish that HIV disease is
an impairment under the Act.86
78. United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984) ("Because Congress explicitly dele-
gated authority to construe the statute by regulation, in this case we must give the regulations
legislative and hence controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or plainly contrary
to the statute."); see supra notes 59-60.
79. See discussion infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text; see also supra note 60.
80. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 942-43 (1st Cir. 1997); Support Ministries for
Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808 F. Supp. 120, 130 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting
that the ADA's legislative history "specifically mentions that infection with HIV is included in
the ADA's definition of 'disability,' which is virtually identical to the definition of 'handicap'
contained in the FHA and the Rehabilitation Act.").
81. See, e.g., ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 3, 1 231 (Supp. Mar. 1992) (noting that
S. REP. No. 101-116 (1989), the Senate report that accompanied the bill in Congress,
"specifically includes infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)"); HENRY H.
PERRrr, JR., AMERICANS wrrH DISABILrrIEs ACT HANDBOOK, § 3.2, at 25 (2d ed. 1991)
(noting that the Senate and House committee reports specifically mention HIV as an
"impairment"); Parmet & Jackson, supra note 48, at 21 ("[T]he legislative history of the ADA
demonstrates conclusively the consensus within Congress that AIDS, as well as asymptomatic
HIV, would be a protected disability under the new law."); Dalrymple-Blackburn, supra note
26, at 856 ("[T]he legislative history of the ADA specifically identifies HIV infection and AIDS
as disabling impairments.").
82. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,330.
83. Id. (quoting REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IM-
MUNODEFICIENCY EPIDEMIC 123 (1988)).
84. I. at 333; see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989) ("The term includes.., infection
with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus .... "). For a more detailed discussion of the legisla-
tive history of the term "impairment" as it relates to HIV disease, see the dissent in Runnebaum
v. Nationsbank of Maryland, N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 176 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Michael, J., dis-
senting).
85. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989).
86. See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70,76 (1984).
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As the First Circuit recently pointed out, moreover,
[T]he ADA's precursor, the Rehabilitation Act, had been construed by the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to protect persons infected with HIV from dis-
crimination; in enacting the ADA, Congress endorsed the DOJ's view, noting
that "a person infected with [HIV] is covered under the first prong of the
definition of the term 'disability' because of a substantial limitation to pro-
creation and intimate sexual relationships."8
Had Congress chosen to eliminate HIV from coverage under the Act,
it would have done so; instead, however, it did precisely the opposite and
endorsed the DOJ's existing interpretation of the term disability to in-
clude HIV.8 Accordingly, the ADA regulation should have the force of
law.
8 9
Not surprisingly, then, courts outside of the Fourth Circuit have con-
sistently ruled that HIV disease-including asymptomatic HIV disease-
is a disability under the ADA (and a handicap under the analogous pro-
vision9° in the Rehabilitation Act).9 Exhaustive research, moreover, has
87. Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 943 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-
485(11), at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334).
88. Even opponents of the ADA understood that HIV would be a covered disability under
the Act. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 48, at 21 ("For example, Senator Jesse Helms, one
of the Act's chief critics, expressed on the Senate floor his clear belief that discrimination
against even asymptomatic HIV-positive persons would be covered by the Act.") (citing 135
CONG. REC. S10765-01 (daily ed. Sept. 6,1989) (statement of Sen. Helms)).
89. As the Third Circuit explained while examining another ADA regulation patterned
after a Section 504 regulation:
[B]ecause Congress mandated that the ADA regulations be patterned after the section
504 coordination regulations, the former regulations have the force of law. When Con-
gress re-enacts a statute and voices its approval of an administrative interpretation of
that statute, that interpretation acquires the force of law and courts are bound by the
regulation. United States v. Board of Comm'rs of Sheffield, Alabama, 435 U.S. 110,134
(1978). The same is true when Congress agrees with an administrative interpretation of
a statute which Congress is re-enacting. See Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429
U.S. 569,574-77 (1977). Although Title II of the ADA is not a re-enactment of section
504, it does extend section 504's anti-discrimination principles to public entities. Fur-
thermore, the legislative history of the ADA shows that Congress agreed with the co-
ordination regulations promulgated under section 504.... [Section 35.130(d)] is almost
identical to the section 504 integration regulation which has been in effect since 1981.
As Congress has voiced its approval of that coordination regulation, 28 C.F.R. §
35.130(d) has the force of law.
Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325,332 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). The same is true of the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act regulations governing "disability" and "handicap." See, e.g., Sup-
port Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808 F. Supp. 120, 130
(N.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[T]he ADA's definition of 'disability'... is virtually identical to the defini-
tion of 'handicap' contained in the... Rehabilitation Act.") (citation omitted). Therefore, 28
C.F.R. section 35.104(1)(ii) (1997) also has the force of law.
90. The definition of "disabled" in the ADA is the same as that of "handicap" under the
Rehabilitation Act, "with the exception of the exclusion of current illegal users of drugs and the
exclusion of certain other individuals." Chai Feldblum, Medical Examinations and Inquiries
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A View from the Inside, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 521, 522
n.10 (1991); see also Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The
ADA defines a disability in substantially the same terms as the Rehabilitation Act defined a
handicap (now disability).... The legislative history of the ADA indicates that Congress in-
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failed to uncover a single case in which either symptomatic HIV disease
or AIDS was held not to be a disability under either the ADA or the Re-
habilitation Act.92 In addition, HIV disease is an established disability
under the Fair Housing Act, which contains a "virtually identical" defini-
tion of "handicap" or "disability" as that included in the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act,93  in several other agency interpretations of
"impairment," 9' and in numerous state disability laws.95 Hence, persons
tended judicial interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act be incorporated by reference when in-
terpreting the ADA.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 711 (1996); Bolton v. Scrivner,
Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 943 (10th Cir. 1994); PERRrrT, supra note 81, § 3.2, at 24 (noting that the defi-
nition of the term "disability" under the ADA "is comparable to the definition of the term
'individual with handicap' in... the Rehabilitation Act").
91. See, e.g., Abbot, 107 F.3d at 939 ("We hold unhesitatingly that HIV-positive status, sim-
pliciter, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, comprises a physical impairment under the
ADA."); Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[A] person infected with the
HIV virus is an individual with a disability within the meaning of the [Rehabilitation] Act.");
Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1990) ("[W]e note that it is well established that
infection with AIDS constitutes a handicap for purposes of the Act."); John Doe v. Montgom-
ery Hosp., No. CIV.A. 95-3168, 1996 WL 745524, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23,1996) (finding asymp-
tomatic plaintiff disabled within the meaning of the ADA); Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston
Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 774-75 (E.D. Tex. 1996); Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317, 319 n.7
(E.D. Va. 1995) ("It is now settled law that HIV-positive individuals are 'disabled' within the
meaning of the ADA."); D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 166, 170 (D.N.J. 1995); Howe v. Hull, 873
F. Supp. 72, 78 (N.D. Ohio 1994) ("AIDS and HIV infection are both disabilities within the
meaning of ADA."); Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 371, 374 n.5 (N.D. Ga.
1994), aff'd, 89 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Morvant, 843 F. Supp. 1092, 1093-94
(E.D. La. 1994); Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 567 n.10 (D.D.C. 1992) ("[T]he
Reagan Administration took the position that HIV-infected persons are handicapped within the
meaning of the [Rehabilitation ] Act."); Casey v. Lewis, 773 F. Supp. 1365, 1370 (D. Ariz. 1991);
Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1385 n.4 (E.D. La. 1989),
affd, 909 F. 2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990); Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States
Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that both symptomatic and asymp-
tomatic HIV disease are impairments under the Act). But see Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of
Md., 95 F.3d 1285 (4th Cir. 1996) (examining plaintiff's claim under Title I, not Title II, of the
ADA); Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995)
(concluding that HIV-positive status does not necessarily qualify as a disability and suggesting
that the asymptomatic plaintiff was probably not disabled within the meaning of the ADA).
92. Even if a court were to find that AIDS is not a disability per se under the ADA (i.e.,
disregarding the clear legislative history, the explicit DOJ regulations, and the weighty judicial
precedent), it would be absurd to rule that AIDS or symptomatic HIV disease is not "a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual." 28 U.S.C. § 35.104 (1994).
93. Support Ministries, 808 F. Supp. at 129 (finding HIV-positive plaintiffs "handicapped"
under the Fair Housing Act and expressing disbelief that defendants could suggest otherwise).
94. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 1636.103 (1997) (Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board); 7
C.F.R. § 15e.103 (1997) (Department of Agriculture); 22 C.F.R. § 1701.103 (1997) (Institute of
Peace); 29 C.F.R. § 34.2 (1997) (Department of Labor); 34 C.F.R. § 1200.103 (1997) (National
Council on Disability); 45 C.F.R. § 2301.103 (1997) (Arctic Research Commission).
95. "[M]any states have recently revised their codes to expressly include people with AIDS
in their definition of disability." ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 3, 1 710 (Supp. Oct.
1992); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50(2) (Harrison Supp. 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
207.135(1) (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.174(1) (West Supp. 1998). In addi-
tion, all fifty states provide disability discrimination protection in some form. See Lovitch, supra
note 53, at 1196. In many states, these laws have been specifically interpreted to cover persons
with HIV and AIDS. See, e.g., Prilliman v. United Air Lines Inc., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142, 147 (Ct.
App. 1997) ("AIDS is a physical handicap within the meaning of Government Code former sec-
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with AIDS who are eligible for social welfare benefits and services are
qualified "individuals with disabilities" under Title II.
2. Persons with AIDS may be regarded as having a disability
Title II also provides that individuals who are "regarded as having [a
defined physical or mental] impairment" are disabled under the Act. This
includes individuals who are "treated by a public entity as having such [a
physical or mental] impairment."96 Accordingly, if a public entity already
treats persons with AIDS differently-e.g., by providing them with sepa-
rate shelter or special nutritional supplements-these individuals may
qualify as disabled regardless of whether they are in fact disabled.7
tion 12926, subdivision (h), as defined by judicial decision.... [Inasmuch as case law reveals a
general consistency between the current and former versions of section 12926, it is a relatively
simple matter to harmonize [them] in their definitions of disability and handicap].") (citations
omitted); Ann Howard's Apricots Restaurant Inc. v. Commission on Hum. Rts. & Opportuni-
ties, 676 A.2d 844, 847 (Conn. 1996) (implying that AIDS is a physical disability for which dis-
crimination is prohibited); Joel Truitt Mgmt., Inc. v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Hum.
Rts., 646 A.2d 1007, 1009 (D.C. 1994) (concluding that AIDS "is a condition falling within the
definition of 'physical handicap'); Raintree Health Care Ctr. v. Illinois Human Rights
Comm'n, 672 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ill. 1996); Cronan v. New England Tel. Co., 41 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273, 1276 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1986) ("[Commentators who have addressed
this issue agree that AIDS is a qualifying handicap under the Rehabilitation Act .... );
Sanchez v. Lagoudakis, 486 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Mich. 1992) ("We are persuaded that a person
with AIDS can be found to be handicapped."); Minnesota v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d 662, 666
(Minn Ct. App. 1992); Poff v. Caro, 549 A.2d 900, 903 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) ("[A]
person suffering from AIDS has a disability caused by injury or illness and, therefore, is pro-
tected by the Law Against Discrimination."); Hill v. Community of Damien of Molokai, 911
P.2d 861, 868 (N.M. 1996); Petri v. Bank of N.Y. Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 608, 610-11 (Sup. Ct. 1992)
(establishing AIDS as a disability under N.Y. State Human Rights Law); Doe v. Denny's, Inc.,
931 P.2d 816, 818 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) ("Plaintiff is physically impaired in that she is HIV posi-
tive."); Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814, 819 (W. Va. 1990) ("[T]his
Court holds that a person at any stage of infection with the human immunodeficiency virus, in-
cluding a person who has tested positive for the antibodies to such virus but who is asympto-
matic, is a person with a 'handicap' within the meaning of W.Va. Code, 5-11-3(t) [1981].");
Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm'n, 476 N.W.2d 707, 721 (Wis. 1991)
(finding that AIDS/ARC constitutes an actual impairment within the meaning of the state dis-
ability statute).
96. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1997) (emphasis omitted). The House Judiciary Committee's ADA
report explains:
This test is intended to cover persons who are treated by a covered entity as having a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. It applies
whether or not a person has an impairment, if that person was treated as if he or she
had an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.
H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,452.
97. See, e.g., Dean v. Knowles, 912 F. Supp. 519, 521 (S.D. Fla. 1996) ("This Court need not
address the issue of whether a person who is HIV positive but asymptomatic is disabled per se
under the ADA. The Eleventh Circuit held.., that HIV seropositivity was a handicap under
the Rehabilitation Act... because the correctional system treated inmates as if they were
handicapped.") (citation omitted); Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States
Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.D.C 1987) ("Persons who carry HIV may be deemed
handicapped in one or both of two ways. It is enough if they are perceived to be handicapped.").
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B. Covered Entities
Title II of the ADA expressly applies to public entities.98 Under the
Act, the term "public entity" is defined, in relevant part, as "any State or
local government" or "any department, agency, special purpose district,
or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government." Title
II applies, moreover, "to all services, programs, and activities provided or
made available by public entities. ' 1° As the DOJ analysis indicates:
Title II of the ADA extends th[e] prohibition of discrimination to include all
services, programs, and activities provided or made available by state and lo-
cal governments or any of their instrumentalities or agencies, regardless of
the receipt of Federal financial assistance.
°10
By contrast, the Rehabilitation Act applies only to programs or activi-
ties that "receiv[e] Federal financial assistance."
1 2
The ADA is thus plainly applicable to the provision of social welfare
benefits by all state and local governments and their instrumentalities.
Because these entities invariably receive federal financial assistance, the
Rehabilitation Act is generally applicable as well.
C. The Third Prong: Access Alone Is Insufficient
"'It is not enough to open the door for the handicapped,"' the Second
Circuit has observed, "'a ramp must be built so the door can be
reached."" 0' 3 Both the DOJ regulationsl' and relevant case law 5 establish
that public entities must not only provide access, but meaningful and
equal access to benefits and services, even if that means making reason-
98. Neither Title II of the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act requires claimants to exhaust
administrative remedies prior to bringing a federal court action. See Tyler v. City of Manhattan,
857 F. Supp. 800, 812 (D. Kan. 1994); Peterson v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 818 F.
Supp. 1276, 1277 (W.D. Wis. 1993); 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 489-90 (1997) ("As with section
504, there is also a private right of action for persons with disabilities... [and] it is not the
Committee's intent that persons with disabilities need to exhaust Federal administrative reme-
dies before exercising their private right of action."). Similarly, state notice-of-claim provisions
do not apply to ADA or Rehabilitation Act claims. See Finley v. Giacobbe, 827 F. Supp. 215,
219 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (1994).
100. 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (1997).
101. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 465 (1997); see also Wolford v. Lewis, 860 F. Supp. 1123,
1134 (S.D. W. Va. 1994) ("Title II of the ADA broadens the protection extended to individuals
with disabilities by prohibiting discriminatory treatment from public entities, including state
departments and agencies, without regard to the receipt of federal financial assistance.");
Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360, 1367 (D. Neb. 1993) ("[T]he ADA is not limited to
programs receiving federal funding, but rather applies to all public entities").
102. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1997).
103. Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 652 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting Brief for Appellants
at 120-21).
104. See discussion infra Subsection III.C.1.
105. See discussion infra Subsection III.C.2.
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able modifications to policies, practices, and procedures to avoid dis-
crimination. By failing to accommodate the special needs of persons with
AIDS in the provision of social welfare benefits and services, numerous
municipalities in the United States are in blatant violation of the ADA.
The following discussion establishes the statutory support for this argu-
ment and demonstrates that relevant case law further supports this con-
clusion.
1. The DOJ regulations: strong medicine
In Title II of the ADA, Congress did not specify the types of actions
included in the term "discrimination," as it did in the employment and
public accommodations sections of the Act."0 Consequently, one must
look to the DOJ regulations that implement Title II to find "the general
principles for analyzing whether any particular action of the public entity
violates [Title II's] mandate. ' ' These regulations are exceedingly helpful
to the ADA plaintiff because they explicitly address the passive,
"unintentional" discrimination that has historically proven so difficult to
combat. As noted, the regulations prohibit practices that have a discrimi-
natory effect irrespective of the entity's motive.
By effectively barring persons with AIDS from meaningful and equal
access to social welfare benefits and services, public entities throughout
the United States are in violation of at least three of these regulations.
First, Section 35.130(b)(1) of the regulations establishes that a public
entity may not "provide a qualified individual with a disability with an
aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportu-
nity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the
same level of achievement as that provided to others . . . ."'0 As the dis-
106. See ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 3,1 222 (Supp. Mar. 1992).
However, the committee reports that accompanied the ADA in Congress reflect its in-
tent that the forms of discrimination set out in other sections of the ADA (§§ 102(b)-
(c) and § 302(b)) be incorporated into the regulations implementing title II, and that
they be consistent with the regulations issued under section 504 [of the Rehabilitation
Act].
L
107. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 475 (1997). Similarly, the regulations promulgated by the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act contain general prohibitions against discrimination. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 (1997).
108. 28 C.F.R. §35.130(b)(1)(iii) (1997); see also ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 3,
814 (Supp. Dec. 1991) ("Aids, services or benefits provided to disabled people must be
equally effective in achieving the intended results of the program or activity."); H.R. REP. No.
101-485(11), at 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 310 ("Discrimination against
people with disabilities includes.., denial of benefits, services, or opportunities to people with
disabilities that are as effective and meaningful as those provided to others."). The HHS regula-
tions establish that recipients of HHS assistance, including Medicaid providers, may not
"[p]rovide a qualified handicapped person with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective
as that provided to others .... 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(1)(iii) (1997). Additionally, recipients may
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cussion in Part I above indicates, because of the unique characteristics of
AIDS, merely opening the doors to various social welfare offices is not
"as effective in affording" those with AIDS "equal opportunity to obtain
the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of
achievement as that provided to others." These individuals face numer-
ous hurdles, many of which-such as frequent and extended hospital
stays-are insurmountable without special assistance.
Second, Section 35.130(b)(3) of the regulations provides that a public
entity may not "utilize criteria or methods of administration... [t]hat
have the effect of subjecting qualified individuals with disabilities to dis-
crimination on the basis of disability ' c9 or "[t]hat have the purpose or ef-
fect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objec-
tives of the public entity's program with respect to individuals with
disabilities... .""o The numerous ongoing documentation requirements
and frequent, mandatory office appointments typical of so many social
welfare agencies throughout the United States are clear examples of
"criteria or methods of administration" that effectively discriminate
against persons with AIDS. Obviously, food stamps and housing supple-
ments cannot achieve their objectives if these benefits are terminated
while clients are hospitalized.
Third, Section 35.130(b)(7) provides: "A public entity shall make rea-
sonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of dis-
ability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifi-
cations would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or
activity.".. The modifications required by persons with AIDS-e.g.,
home and hospital visits by case workers, low client-to-case worker ra-
tios, and relaxation or waiver of office appointments and ongoing docu-
mentation requirements" 2 -are both reasonable and necessary to avoid
discriminating against persons with AIDS.
not "[o]therwise limit a qualified handicapped person in the enjoyment of any right, privilege,
advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving an aid, benefit, or service." Id. §
84.4(b)(1)(vii). The HHS regulations further provide:
For purposes of this part, aids, benefits, and services, to be equally effective, are not
required to produce the identical result or level of achievement for handicapped and
nonhandicapped persons, but must afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to
obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achieve-
ment, in the most integrated setting appropriate to the person's needs.
45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2) (1997).
109. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(i) (1997).
110. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(ii) (1997). The HHS regulations provide that recipients may
not "utilize criteria or methods of administration.., that have the purpose or effect of defeating
or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient's program ..." 45
C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(4) (1997).
111. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1997).
112. See discussion supra Section I.B.
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In fact, these modifications are wholly consistent with an example of a
reasonable modification provided by the DOJ itself."' They are also con-
sistent with the reasonable modifications set forth in Subpart D of the
DOJ regulations, which govern program accessibility. These modifica-
tions include "assignment of aides to beneficiaries, home visits, [and] de-
livery of services at alternate accessible sites. 114 Making these modifica-
tions, moreover, would not in any way "fundamentally alter the nature
of" the social welfare benefits and services.115 Persons with AIDS would
not receive different or enhanced food stamps, Medicaid, or public assis-
tance, but rather equal and meaningful access to the same benefits. 6 This
is precisely what Title II of the ADA was enacted to achieve. As the fol-
lowing discussion demonstrates, moreover, relevant case law interpreting
these regulations firmly supports this conclusion.
2. Relevant Case Law
A recent, unreported decision by the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York in Henrietta D. v. Giuliani,117 the only case to ex-
113. DOJ provided the following example of a reasonable modification:
A county general relief program provides emergency food, shelter, and cash grants to
individuals who can demonstrate their eligibility. The application process, however, is
extremely lengthy and complex. When many individuals with mental disabilities apply
for benefits, they are unable to complete the application process successfully. As a re-
sult, they are effectively denied benefits to which they are otherwise entitled. In this
case, the county has an obligation to make reasonable modifications to its application
process to ensure that otherwise eligible individuals are not denied needed benefits.
Modifications to the relief program might include simplifying the application process
or providing applicants who have mental disabilities with individualized assistance to
complete the process.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TITLE II TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL 11-3.6100, at 13 (1992). Individuals with AIDS face different but wholly
analogous hurdles and thus require similar modifications.
114. 28 C.F.R. §35.150(b)(1) (1997). Training case workers in the special needs of persons
with AIDS, and in the need to maintain confidentiality, is also consistent with Congress' intent.
See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 473 ("In or-
der to comply with the non-discrimination mandate, it is often necessary to provide training to
public employees about disability.").
115. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1997).
"116. A leading commentator on the ADA offers further guidance:
To assist in clarifying the judicial conceptualization of "fundamental alteration," com-
mentators have proposed the following definition: "(1) a substantial change in the pri-
mary purpose or benefit of a program or activity; or (2) a substantial impairment of
necessary or essential components required to achieve a program or activity's primary
purpose or benefit."
Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Equal Members of the Community": The Public Accommodations
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 551, 561 (1991) (quoting
Burgdorf & Bell, Eliminating Discrimination Against Physically and Mentally Handicapped
Persons: A Statutory Blueprint, 8 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITIES L. REP. 64,70 (Jan./Feb.
1984)). The reasonable modifications required by persons with AIDS would not constitute a
fundamental alteration under either of these definitions.
117. Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, No. 95-CV-0641, 1996 WL 633382, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25,
1996).
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amine this issue, fully supports the argument that reasonable modifica-
tions in the provision of social welfare benefits and services are required
to avoid discriminating against persons with AIDS. Henrietta D., how-
ever, is not without support. Courts examining similar circumstances
have established that public entities must affirmatively act to ensure per-
sons with disabilities equal and meaningful access to the benefits and
services they provide. Specifically, as long as those benefits and services
would not be fundamentally altered, entities must make reasonable
modifications to their programs, policies, and procedures to avoid even
unintentional discrimination. Following a discussion and analysis of the
Henrietta D. decision, these supporting precedents shall be briefly exam-
ined below.
The plaintiffs in Henrietta D., a class of New York City residents with
AIDS and HIV-related disease,118 filed suit against Mayor Rudolph Gi
uliani and the New York City and State Departments of Social Services
challenging significant cuts to New York City's Division of AIDS Serv-
ices (DAS). DAS was created by the City of New York in 1985 to assist
persons with AIDS and HIV-related disease in applying for and receiving
social welfare benefits and services. 9 DAS was established as a "case
management system, with each DAS client assigned to a specific case
manager who serves as the client's contact person for all social services
and who helps to process the client's applications for various forms of aid
and social services.''12 Among other things, DAS clients receive expe-
121dited services, cash supplements, and home visits from case managers.
Persons are eligible for DAS if they demonstrate that they are residents
of New York City, that they have AIDS or HIV-related disease, and that
they are eligible for the benefits and services administered by the City of
New York.12
Plaintiffs alleged that, owing to significant budget cuts, "DAS system-
atically operates with 'widespread, protracted delays, errors, and unjusti-
fied denials of crucial subsistence benefits."" Plaintiffs further alleged
that "DAS is meant to fulfill the requirements that are mandated by the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act because without a properly functioning
118. The New York State Department of Health's AIDS Institute defines HIV-related dis-
ease as including AIDS, as defined by the CDC, "along with clinical conditions that are substan-
tially affected by their association with HIV infection and represent evidence of clinical disease.
These additional conditions include cardiologic, gynecologic, and neoplastic manifestations, as
well as syphilis." Informational Letter from the N.Y. State Dep't of Social Services to Commis-
sioners of Social Services 2 (Sept. 4,1992) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
119. Henrietta D., 1996 WL 633382, at *2
120. Id.
121. See id. at *3.
122. See id. at *1.
123. kla t *2 (quoting Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 6).
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DAS, they are unable to access the basic public assistance for which they
are eligible."1 24 In other words, plaintiffs alleged that defendants were
denying them "meaningful access" and "reasonable accommodations" or
"modifications" in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.' 2
In considering plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and de-
fendants' motion to dismiss, the court first noted the unique physical dif-
ficulties that plaintiffs faced in accessing social welfare benefits and serv-
ices:"'
People with HIV infection develop numerous illnesses and physical condi-
tions not found in the general population, and experience manifestations of
common illnesses that are much more aggressive, recurrent, and difficult to
treat. Infections and cancers spread more rapidly in a person whose immune
system has been compromised, and ... [illlnesses not lethal to the general
population can kill an HIV-infected person. For all these reasons, persons
with AIDS and HIV-related disease experience serious functional limitations
that make it extremely difficult, if not in some cases impossible, to negotiate
the complicated City social service system on their own.
In denying their motion to dismiss, the court rejected defendants' ar-
gument that neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act requires defen-
dants to make affirmative efforts to accommodate plaintiffs' disabilities:
Defendants are incorrect to the extent that their argument is based on the
presumption that they need not make any affirmative efforts to assist plain-
tiffs in getting their benefits and that DAS is therefore entirely legally gratui-
tous. The Second Circuit stated over ten years ago that the Rehabilitation
Act "requires some degree of positive effort" and "at least 'modest, affirma-
tive steps' to accommodate the handicapped."'
12
8
Accordingly, the court established that public entities must modify
the manner in which they provide social welfare benefits and services to
persons with AIDS:
Public assistance is generally provided to eligible New Yorkers when they
meet their periodic appointment schedules and verify their status in other
ways. Frequently this means waiting in long lines, and if they receive more
than one type of benefit, it means doing so at several different locations.
Given plaintiffs' disability and, in particular, the ease with which even minor
infections can profoundly threaten their health, it is clear that defendants
must provide Food Stamps, Home Relief, and other public assistance benefits
in some modified fashion to these plaintiffs.
2 9
124. Ia at *8.
125. Id
126. Defendants conceded that plaintiffs were individuals with disabilities or handicaps
"within the meaning of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act." Id at *7.
127. Id. at *2 (citations omitted).
128. lId at *8 (emphasis added) (quoting Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 652, 653 n.6
(2d Cir. 1982)).
129. Id at *9.
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Equally important, the court held that such modifications are not
fundamental alterations but reasonable modifications, as required by
Section 35.130(b)(7) of the DOJ regulations:
[D]efendants' effort to present DAS as entirely discretionary and
simply a service provided out of the kindness of their hearts is inaccurate,
if not insincere. The goal of DAS, at least in part, is to facilitate HIV-
positive clients who are ill through the complex maze of social services
that provide the variety of public assistance benefits to which plaintiffs
are entitled. At a minimum, in its most basic, facilitory [sic] efforts, DAS
is a necessary modification to, and not a fundamental alteration of, the
public assistance services that the City provides to all eligible New York-
130ers.
Ultimately, the court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary in-
junction on factual rather than legal grounds. Quite simply, the court
ruled that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed in proving that "DAS is or
will be debilitated to such a degree that it no longer acts or will act as the
required reasonable modification to New York City's public assistance
programs for AIDS and HIV-positive clients.' 13' The court ruled that
DAS "does appear to serve as a reasonable modification" and "to assist
plaintiffs in meaningfully accessing welfare benefits," and that a proposed
restructuring plan would likely "address the bureaucratic problems" of
DAS.132
Though refusing to grant a preliminary injunction on factual grounds,
the court unequivocally upheld the rights of persons with AIDS to pre-
cisely the sort of modifications advocated in this Article. Indeed, the
court referred to New York's DAS as a "necessary modification' ' 33 and a
"required reasonable modification to ensure meaningful access."'' The
decision clearly indicates, then, that cities throughout the United States
that have failed to implement equivalent modifications are in violation of
the Act. 3
130. Id. at *9 (emphasis added). Section 35.130(b)(7) requires such reasonable modifica-
tions "unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamen-
tally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1997); see
supra text accompanying note 111.
131. Id. at *10.
132. 1&
133. 1& at *9.
134. 1&t at *9; see also id. at *10 ("[I]t seems true that some form of DAS or an agency like
it must exist to facilitate and assist plaintiffs in their accessing of public assistance ... ").
135. Following the court's decision in Henrietta D., in July 1997, the City Council of New
York City amended the City's administrative code to mandate the reasonable modifications
sought by plaintiffs in that lawsuit. A number of those modifications have already been set
forth. See supra Section I.B. Among the modifications for clients with AIDS and HIV-related
disease mandated by the new law are the adoption of an "intensive case management" system
"with an overall average ratio for all cases which shall not exceed one case-worker or supervisor
Vol. 16:373, 1998
Americans With Disabilities Act
This conclusion is supported by other relevant ADA and Rehabilita-
tion Act case law. Any analysis of the relevant law must begin with the
Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Choate."' Indeed, "[i]n the
legislative history of title II, the congressional committees held out
Choate as the definitive interpretation of section 504 [of the Rehabilita-
tion Act] that it intended title II to copy."' ' The standards that the DOJ
adopted in Title II are therefore consistent with, and reflective of, the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
in Choate.
138
The plaintiffs in Choate, a group of disabled state Medicaid recipients,
challenged Tennessee's proposal to reduce from twenty to fourteen the
number of days that state Medicaid would pay hospitals on behalf of
Medicaid recipients. Although the limitation was neutral on its face,
plaintiffs argued that it would disproportionately affect people with dis-
abilities in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. In oft-quoted language,
the Court first established that, under the Rehabilitation Act,
an otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with mean-
ingful access to the benefit that the grantee offers .... [T]o assure meaning-
ful access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee's program or benefit
may have to be made.
139
The Court ruled, however, that plaintiffs sought more than mere
equal or meaningful access; rather, they wanted "to alter th[e] definition
of the benefit being offered."' 4 Because the disabled had "meaningful
and equal access" to the same benefit provided to others, the Court con-
cluded that Tennessee was not obligated to reinstate its twenty-day rule
or to provide greater coverage for the disabled.4
The plaintiffs in Choate challenged a facially-neutral reduction in
benefits to all recipients, seeking greater benefits for themselves. By con-
to thirty-four cases," N.Y. CrrY ADMIN. CODE § 21-127 (approved July 11, 1997), and "a home
or hospital visit for the purpose of establishing eligibility and applying for benefits and serv-
ices," id. § 21-128(b).
136. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
137. Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: The Rela-
tionship Between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title HI of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1089,1115 (1995).
138. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 477 (1997); PER~r=r, supra note 81, § 9.4, at 166
("Section 35.130(b)(3) incorporates the United States Supreme Court's interpretation in Alex-
ander v. Choate of certain Rehabilitation Act § 504 requirements.").
139. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985). The Court noted that "much of the conduct that
Congress sought to alter in passing the Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if not impossible to
reach were the Act construed to proscribe only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent." Id.
at 296-97; see also Wilder v. City of New York, 568 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
("Section 504 differs from Title VI in that discriminatory intent is not essential to a violation of
the Rehabilitation Act."); 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 477 (1997) (citing Choate).
140. Choate, 469 U.S. at 303.
141. See id. at 306.
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trast, persons with AIDS seeking redress under the ADA would not re-
quire any enhancement of the benefits and services provided to others.
Rather, these individuals require meaningful and equal access to the very
same benefits and services. Also unlike the plaintiffs in Choate, persons
with AIDS have been and will continue to be denied meaningful and
equal access without reasonable modifications to existing programs. Un-
der the Supreme Court's reasoning in Choate, public entities that fail to
make those reasonable modifications are thus in violation of both the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
In Concerned Parents to Save Dreher Park Center v. City of West
Palm Beach142 (Dreher Park), the District Court for the Southern District
of Florida addressed facts similar to those at issue in this Article. In Dre-
her Park, plaintiffs moved for an injunction under Title II of the ADA to
compel the defendant to restore municipal recreational programs de-
signed for people with physical disabilities that were eliminated "as a re-
sult of budget constraints."'1 43 In granting the injunction, the court found
that the elimination of the programs had "the effect of denying persons
with disabilities the benefits of the City's recreational programs. '44 The
court explained:
The City emphasizes that none of the City's recreational programs are closed
to individuals with disabilities, and in this round-about way the City seems to
be arguing that because no discriminatory animus exists, there is no Title II
violation. Certainly intentional discrimination is banned by Title II. But fur-
ther, actions that have the effect of discriminating against individuals with
disabilities likewise violate the ADA.
1 45
The court's reasoning in Dreher Park can be applied to the issue in
contention here. Although public entities may well argue, as in Dreher
Park, that their failure to accommodate persons with AIDS lacks
"discriminatory intent," persons with AIDS "are without a meaningful
access to the benefits of the City's... programs. It is this effective denial
of equal benefit that violates the ADA."' ' If anything, the plight of per-
sons with AIDS is more compelling, since the services and benefits at is-
sue for these individuals provide the food, shelter, medical care, and in-
142. 846 F. Supp. 986 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
143. Id at 989.
144. Id at 991. The court observed that these programs "were needed to give equal bene-
fits of recreation to persons with disabilities. When these programs were eliminated, Plaintiffs
were denied the benefits of the City's leisure services in contravention of Title II." Id at 992.
145. Ide at 991; see also supra note 56 (listing cases supporting the assertion that the ADA is
not limited to circumstances involving deliberate discrimination). The court noted that its inter-
pretation was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Choate. See Dreher Park, 846 F.
Supp. at 991 n.12.
146. Id at 992 n.14.
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come necessary for their survival.147
In the subsequent Concerned Parents to Save Dreher Park Center v.
City of West Palm Beach1'4 (Dreher Park II), the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida explained that the City's denial of equal ac-
cess to the benefits or programs offered to non-disabled individuals con-
stituted discrimination "by reason of" plaintiffs' disabilities:
[P]laintiffs could not participate in the programs offered to the non-disabled
populations and required special services, none of which were available after
the elimination of the Dreher Park Center programs. The City, therefore,
denied the benefits of the City's leisure services program to the plaintiffs by
reason of the plaintiffs' disabilities. Such a denial violated the ADA. There-
fore, the City is liable to the plaintiffs.
149
Analogously, persons with AIDS have a disability that prevents them
from meaningfully participating in the programs offered to non-disabled
individuals, and they require reasonable modifications that are unavail-
able in numerous municipalities throughout the United States. These
municipalities, therefore, have denied persons with AIDS the benefit of
programs and services by reason of their disabilities. As in Dreher Park
II, this denial violates the ADA.10
The Second Circuit's decision in Dopico v. Goldschmidt" proves
similarly instructive. In Dopico, the plaintiffs brought a class action
against local and federal defendants under the Rehabilitation Act for
failing to make public transportation accessible to the disabled. In grant-
ing plaintiffs' request for declaratory and injunctive relief, the court em-
phasized that "plaintiffs do not seek fundamental changes in the nature
of a program by means of alterations in its standards.', 5 2 In such in-
stances, the court explained, "where the relief requested did not modify
147. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) ("[The termination of benefits] may
deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks
independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. His need to concentrate
upon finding the means for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to seek redress
from the welfare bureaucracy."); Willis v. Lascaris, 499 F. Supp. 749, 760 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)
("[Tihe consequence of those mistakes in the social service arena, are more harmful than if they
are made in other governmental programs because the ability of people to survive may be jeop-
ardized.").
148. 853 F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (entering consent judgment).
149. Id. at 426.
150. As the court explained in Dreher Park, "while Title II does not require any particular
level of services for persons with disabilities in an absolute sense, it does require that any bene-
fits provided to non-disabled persons must be equally made available for disabled persons." 846
F. Supp. at 992. In Civic Association of the Deaf of New York City v. Giuliani, 915 F. Supp. 622
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), the court enjoined the removal from city streets of alarm boxes that deaf plain-
tiffs use to report fires. See id. at 637 ("[W]ere Defendants proposing to eliminate fire services
in their entirety, no claim would arise under the ADA. But for as long as a service, program, or
activity remains in existence, as here, the ADA requires that it be accessible to the disabled.").
151. 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982).
152. Id at 653.
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some integral aspect of a defendant's program, courts have ruled that sec-
tion 504 does require efforts to make the program available to otherwise
qualified handicapped persons."'5 The court therefore concluded that
"csection 504 does require at least 'modest, affirmative steps' to accom-
modate the handicapped,"'5 4 or "some degree of positive effort to expand
the availability of federally funded programs to handicapped persons
otherwise qualified to benefit from them."' 5
Persons with AIDS similarly do not require "fundamental changes in
the nature of a program by means of alterations in its standards.', 56 They
do, however, require "modest, affirmative steps"' 7 and "some degree of
positive effort.', 58 Therefore, under Dopico, public entities should be re-
quired to expand the availability of services, programs, and benefits to
individuals with AIDS who are otherwise qualified to benefit from
them.159
In Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 6° the Second Circuit affirmed the
issuance of a preliminary injunction under the Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act (FHAA).161 The plaintiff in Shapiro, a woman with multiple
sclerosis, sought a preliminary injunction ordering her cooperative
apartment complex and its board of directors to provide her with an in-
door parking space ahead of others on a waiting list, thus modifying the
cooperative's first come, first served policy as a reasonable accommoda-
tion of her disability. The district court granted the injunction, and the
apartment complex appealed.
The Second Circuit upheld the district court's finding that, without
the injunction, the plaintiff would likely suffer irreparable physical and
153. Id. at 653 n.6.
154. Id. at 652.
155. L at 653 n.6; see also Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, No. 95-CV-0641, 1996 WL 633382, at
*8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1996) (stating that city and state officials were required to make affirma-
tive efforts to assist eligible city residents with AIDS or HIV in getting their benefits); Marisol
A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 660, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[A] disabled individual is entitled to
meaningful access to the benefits and services provided by a public agency or an agency re-
ceiving federal funds. Access alone... is insufficient. Rather, a court may require an agency, un-
der certain circumstances, to take affirmative steps to ensure that the access is meaningful.")
(citations omitted and emphasis added), affd, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997).
156. Dopico, 687 F.2d at 653.
157. Id. at 652.
158. lI at 653 n.6.
159. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) ("[T]o assure meaningful access,
reasonable accommodations in the grantee's program or benefit may have to be made."); 45
C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, at 336 (1997) ("[I]n order to meet the individual needs of handicapped
persons to the same extent that the corresponding needs of nonhandicapped persons are met,
adjustments to regular programs or the provision of different programs may sometimes be nec-
essary.").
160. 51 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 1995).
161. As the Second Circuit noted, the FHAA was based on the standard of reasonable ac-
commodation developed under the Rehabilitation Act. See iL at 334.
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emotional harm because she "was subject to risk of injury, infection, and
humiliation in the absence of a parking space in her building.', 6 2 The in-
juries suffered by persons with AIDS who are effectively denied access to
social welfare benefits and services-months without adequate cash, food
stamps, and necessary home care-are far more severe and life-
threatening than those faced by the plaintiff in Shapiro and plainly sup-
port the issuance of relief under the ADA.
Finally, in Dees v. Austin Travis County Mental Health and Mental
Retardation,'63 plaintiffs alleged that defendant's board of trustees vio-
lated the ADA by holding meetings at a time that made it impossible for
plaintiffs, who suffered drowsiness from medication for mental illness, to
attend. The court ruled that the board's policy of holding regular board
meetings at 7:00 a.m. effectively excluded plaintiffs from exercising their
right to participate in these public meetings. 64 The court found, moreo-
ver, that the defendant had failed to demonstrate that changing the time
of the regular meetings to 9:00 a.m. or later would "fundamentally alter
the nature of the board because it is comprised of volunteers with other
commitments."'65 Accordingly, the court ordered that regular board
meetings be held sometime between 9:30 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.'66
All of these cases "stress the concept of equal opportunity, not merely
equal treatment, to eliminate discrimination,"'67 as Congress intended.'68
All demonstrate, moreover, that a finding of discriminatory animus is not
necessary to succeed on an ADA claim; action or inaction that has the
effect of discriminating against the disabled violates the ADA.'69 Ac-
cordingly, all of these cases amply support the legal requirement to pro-
vide reasonable modifications to persons with AIDS in the provision of
social welfare benefits and services.
IV. CONCLUSION
In municipalities throughout the United States, public entities offer
persons with AIDS no modifications or accommodations in the provision
162. Id. at 332. Similar to persons with AIDS, the plaintiff in Shapiro suffered from "an in-
curable disease that gradually and progressively sap[ped] her strength and interfere[d] with her
balance and bodily functions." Id. (citing Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 116,122
(E.D.N.Y. 1994)).
163. 860 F. Supp. 1186 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
164. See id. at 1190.
165. Id.; cf. State ex rel. Nelson v. Fuerst, 607 N.E.2d 836, 840 (Ohio 1993) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that a state agency's refusal to make public records available to indi-
viduals who are physically unable to travel to the location of the records may violate the ADA).
166. See Dees, 860 F. Supp. at 1192.
167. ADA COMPLIANcE GUIDE, supra note 3, 1 804 (Supp. Dec. 1991).
168. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
169. See supra Section II.A.
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of social welfare benefits and services. As a result, these individuals are
deprived of meaningful access to vitally important benefits and services
to which they are entitled. This deprivation is life-threatening for persons
with AIDS, who depend upon these benefits and services for their sur-
vival. The inability of persons with AIDS to obtain and maintain the
benefits and services to which they are entitled affects their short- and
long-term health and, ultimately, their life expectancy.70
As the demographics of AIDS continue to change, and as AIDS con-
tinues to increase disproportionately among the less advantaged-people
of color, women, and children-this problem will only worsen.7  The
poorer172 and less powerful the persons with AIDS, the greater their need
for meaningful access to life-sustaining benefits and services and the
more critical the protections of the ADA become. Indeed, where other
civil rights acts have failed these communities for lack of proof of animus,
the ADA may well succeed, since it explicitly recognizes that "access
alone ... is insufficient."'7
New York City has taken the lead in enacting legislation that seeks to
ensure the reasonable accommodations that persons with AIDS require.
170. See, e.g., Haskins v. Stanton, 794 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he depriva-
tion of food 'is extremely serious and is quite likely to impose lingering, if not irreversible, hard-
ships upon recipients."') (quoting Haskins v. Stanton, 621 F. Supp. 622, 627-28 (N.D. Ind.
1985)); Bizjak v. Blum, 490 F. Supp. 1297, 1303 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) ("As has often been recog-
nized by the Courts in public assistance cases, recipients of such benefits are generally com-
pletely reliant upon the continued receipt of them for their very survival."). These observations
ring even more true when describing individuals living with AIDS.
171. See FRUMKIN & LEONARD, supra note 4, at 128-29 ("During the 1990s, Blacks have
had a greater proportional increase in rates of HIV infection as compared with Whites....
Women of childbearing age constitute a growing population of HIV-infected persons, and peri-
natal transmission of HIV is increasing at an alarming rate."); Lovitch, supra note 53, at 1213
("As more women, children, and people of color contract the virus, the need to reform the
[health care] system in response to HIV disease will become even more urgent."); Parmet &
Jackson, supra note 49, at 29 ("By the late 1980s,... intravenous drug users and heterosexual
people of color increasingly contracted the disease. As they did, the connections between HIV
patients and mainstream American began to unravel. AIDS was becoming even more and more
a problem of socially outcast groups."); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Women & AIDS: The Better Half
Got the Worse End, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1997, § 4, at 1 ("The trends are particularly troubling
for women, who account for 20 percent of the AIDS population and are joining the nation's ros-
ter of cases faster than men. Most infected women are also minorities, and most are poor and
uneducated."); Mediconsult.com, Pediatric AIDS (visited Nov. 7, 1997)
<http:llwww.mediconsult.comlnoframes/aidslshareware/aids/17.html> ("6,209 children in the
United States have developed AIDS through Dec. 31, 1994."); NIAID, supra note 29 ("The
epidemic is growing most rapidly among minority populations and is a leading killer of African-
American males. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the
prevalence of AIDS is six times higher in African-Americans and three times higher among
Hispanics than among whites.").
172. See, e.g., David D. Ho, Preface to FRUMKIN & LEONARD, supra note 4, at xvii ("In the
United States, the epidemic has shifted from the male homosexual population into the urban
poor."); Lovitch, supra note 53, at 1218 (noting that "HIV disease often strikes those in areas
pervaded by drug use and poverty").
173. Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662,685 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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In municipalities where persons with AIDS lack the numbers and clout of
the New York City community, the ADA can fulfill the same role. Per-
sons with AIDS and their advocates can and should file suit under the
ADA to compel public entities to comply with their legal obligation to
provide equal and meaningful access to crucial benefits and services.
Such relief does not invade the decision-making provinces of state and
local executive and legislative officials, but merely requires that those of-
ficials comply with the law. 74 Eight years after the passage of the ADA,
this relief is already long overdue.
174. In one case, for example, a district court granted granting relief to plaintiffs who
claimed that city defendants regularly failed to provide timely benefits as a result of inadequate
staffing. See Morel v. Giuliani, 927 F. Supp. 622, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("This relief does not in-
vade the decision-making provinces of State and City executive and legislative officials, but
would require City Defendants to resolve their fiscal difficulties in a fashion that complies with
the Constitution and the law."); see also Hurley v. Toia, 432 F. Supp. 1170, 1176 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) ("Although the Court is well aware of the fiscal crises facing the governmental entities
responsible for funding the Home Relief program, this kind of economic hardship pales before
the 'brutal need' of the recipient for continued public assistance benefits.").

